In an in…nitely-lived framework, taxing capital income may be growth and welfare enhancing when it allows for correcting distorting externalities in the competitive equilibrium allocation. This is the case when public capital is subject to congestion by private capital or total income [Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) ] or when government expenditure exerts an external e¤ect on physical capital [Corsetti and Roubini (1996) ]. However, none of these features appear in simple one-sector endogenous growth models with public capital. Alternatively, we consider certain realistic …scal policy constraints in a simple one-sector growth model with productive and unproductive public expenditures, to show that raising revenues through factor income taxes may be preferred to using lump-sum taxes.
Introduction
How should public expenses be …nanced? Should existing tax systems be reorganized and income taxes be substituted by less distorting taxes? How high should public investment be as a percentage of GNP? Issues like these, regarding the e¤ects of …scal policy on growth and welfare, have been widely debated in the public …nance literature. Most work has focused on the incidence of a second-best tax structure in dynamic settings, in the line of the seminal paper by Ramsey (1927) . Along this line, pioneer work by Judd (1985) , Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) emphasized the negative incidence of capital income taxes on welfare in general equilibrium models. Judd (1999) argued for a zero tax rate on physical and human capital income in the long-run. and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) extended the zero tax rate result to labor and consumption taxes in models with human capital, although pointing out that certain public revenue constraints could imply that taxing productive factors positively in the long-run might be optimal in a second-best sense. Nevertheless, the general presumption drawn from previous work is that raising revenues through lump-sum taxes is more favorable to welfare than taxing income from productive factors.
A parallel renewed line of research emerged with Barro (1990) , who combined the public …nance literature, the study of productive public expenditures and the endogenous growth literature. 1 Among others, Futagami et al. (1993) , Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Turnovsky (1996 Turnovsky ( , 2000 are extended versions of Barro (1990) . In them, public revenues come from proportional income taxes and the government chooses the welfaremaximizing ratio of productive public expenditures-to-output. However, in that setting, not much work has been done regarding the optimal simultaneous choice of a productive public expenditure/output ratio and a …nancing rule. 2 In this paper, we aim to make some progress along this line. In a Barro-type setting we characterize the welfare-maximizing productive public expenditure/output ratio under alternative tax scenarios, which are, for the sake of simplicity, those considered in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) : (i) a distortionary tax on total income and (ii) a lump-sum tax, in both cases with a period-by-period balanced budget. We …nd that, under certain realistic …scal policy constraints, raising revenues through taxes on total income might be a preferred strategy to raising revenues through lump-sum taxation.
An argument in favor of taxing in a distorting fashion arises from distributive considerations. Generally, the positive e¤ect of income distribution between generations makes a zero tax rate on capital income not to be optimal: see Jones and Manuelli (1992) in an overlapping generations setting with production, and Caballé (1998) in an in…nitely-lived framework with altruistic preferences. Alternatively, in an in…nitely-lived framework, distorting taxation may become optimal when the competitive equilibrium allocation involves a harmful externality that could be corrected, at least partially, by taxing factors income. 1 Empirical work by Ratner (1983) , Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) emphasizes the positive link between public expenses and the private production process. 2 Exceptions are, among others, Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) in a neoclassical growth model and Corsetti and Roubini (1996) in a two-sector endogenous growth setting.
For example, Chamley (2001) shows that borrowing constraints may induce individuals to over-accumulate capital in the long-run when insuring against idiosyncratic shocks. In models with public capital, productive public expenditures are sometimes assumed to exert a positive external e¤ect on physical capital [as in Corsetti and Roubini (1996) ], while private capital over-congests public capital in competitive equilibrium in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) . In these environments, taxing capital income in the long-run would be optimum, since otherwise physical capital would over-accumulate in competitive equilibrium.
In this paper we consider more fundamental reasons for distorting taxes to be a preferred revenue raising strategy in a one-sector endogenous growth model with noncongested public capital. An explicit …scal policy constraint is assumed, 3 in the form of a constant unproductive public expenditure/output ratio (i.e., due to ine¢cient bureaucratic or administrative costs, or to the payment of interest on outstanding debt), which will limit the choice of the productive public investment/output ratio when maximizing growth or welfare. In a Barro-type setting, a tax increase can be used to …nance a higher level of productive public expenditures, which has a direct and positive impact on growth and welfare. If the source of revenues is income taxes, private capital accumulation is discouraged, and the positive e¤ect on growth and welfare of the increase in productive public expenditures is partly neutralized. On the other hand, although lump-sum tax …nancing is not harmful for private capital accumulation, private consumption will be strongly a¤ected, since it will experience most of the implied crowding-out e¤ect.
Therefore, choosing between distorting and non-distorting taxes represents a tradeo¤ between current and future consumption. Discouraging private capital accumulation, distorting taxes have a long-run e¤ect on future growth and consumption. Alternatively, taxing lump-sum has a strong short-run e¤ect on consumption, with no disincentive on private capital accumulation. Which tax system is preferred will depend on the relative size of both e¤ects on welfare. What is speci…c to our model is that …nancing unproductive expenditures through lump-sum taxes produces a strong crowding-out impact on current consumption which may sharply reduce the possibilities for public investment. This distorts the accumulation of public capital, relative to private capital, limiting the growth stimulus achievable through public investment. It turns out that this restriction can be more damaging for growth and welfare than the disincentive created on private capital accumulation when taxing productive factors' income.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic framework is described. In section 3 the competitive equilibrium and the long-run equilibrium path are characterized. In sections 4 the growth-and welfare-maximizing public investment policies under income and lump-sum taxes are compared, and a simple numerical example is presented. Finally, section 5 ends with main conclusions and extensions.
A basic framework for analysis
The model draws on work by Barro (1990) , Futagami et al. (1993) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) . It di¤ers from the non-congested version in the Glomm-Ravikumar setting because of the presence of an spillover factor in production and the fact that not all public expenditure is productive. The economy consists of a continuum of …rms indexed by [0,1], a …scal authority and a representative household.
Firms
Firms are identical, rent the same amount of physical capital k t and labor l t from households, and produce y t units of the consumption commodity at a given period t. The capital stock used in the aggregate by all …rms, K t , is taken as a proxy for the index of knowledge available to each single …rm [as in Romer (1986) ]. Additionally, public capital, K g t , is exogenous to the private production process and a¤ects all individual …rms in the same way. Except for these externalities, the private production technology can be represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas function presenting constant returns to scale. For any …rm,
where ® is the share of private capital in output, µ and Á are the constant elasticities of output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index, and z is a technological scale.
Since all …rms are identical, we can aggregate on (2.1), to obtain total output in the economy, Y t ,
where L t ; K t are the total amounts of labor and physical capital used by all the …rms in the economy. During period t, each …rm pays the competitive-determined wage w t on the labor it hires and the rate r t on the capital it rents. The pro…t maximizing problem of the typical …rm turns out to be static,
leading to the usual marginal product conditions,
3)
where we have used the fact that each …rm treats its own contribution to the aggregate capital stock as given. From these optimality conditions we have the standard result on income distribution,
The public sector
The public sector collects taxes to …nance its expenditures, which are distributed between public investment, I g t , and public services, C g t , the latter not entering as an argument in consumers' utility or in the production function, but being required for the public sector to exist. The government is assumed to follow a policy that maintains constant ratios, { i and { c , of both types of public expenditures to total output,
with { i + { c < 1. Public capital accumulates according to,
Tax revenues …nance total public expenses every period. Two alternative tax scenarios are considered [as in Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) ]: (i) a distorting taxation scheme, where total income is taxed at a rate ¿ t ; while transfers, X t , are zero, with a government budget constraint, 9) and (ii) a non-distorting tax scenario, with ¿ t = 0, and the government …nancing its expenditures through lump-sum taxes,
Households
We assume zero population growth and normalize population size to one. The representative consumer is the owner of physical capital, and allocates her resources between consumption, C t , and investment in physical capital, I t . Private physical capital accumulates over time according to,
and decisions are made each period to maximize the discounted aggregate value of the time separable, logarithmic utility function 12) subject to the resource constraint,
under income taxes and
under lump-sum taxes. K t+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end of time t, with K 0 > 0, and¯is the discount factor, between zero and one. The consumer takes …scal policy and factor prices as given when deciding how to split her current income between consumption and savings. When the government …nances its operations through income taxes, the optimality condition for the consumer is
while in the case of lump-sum taxation, the optimality condition becomes,
together with the budget constraint, either (2.13) or (2.14), the transversality condition,
and K t+1¸0 ; C t¸0 , for any period t. 
In fact, marginal utility at the origin equal to in…nity guarantees that strict inequalities will hold for K t+1 > 0; C t > 0 at all time periods, which we use in what follows.
The balanced growth path
The balanced growth path is a ¼-CE trajectory along which aggregate variables grow at a zero or positive constant rate. Barro (1990) , Rebelo (1991) and , among others, have shown that cumulative inputs must present constant returns to scale in the private production process (i.e., ® + µ + Á = 1) and r t must be constant and high enough, for the equilibrium to display positive and steady growth in our Barro-type setting. From now on, we will focus on the special case in which 4 ® + µ + Á = 1. Under these conditions, it is easy to show from the equilibrium conditions that Y t , C t , K t , K g t , C g t and X t must all grow at the same constant rate, denoted ¹°hereinafter, along the balanced growth path, while bounded variables, such as ¿ t and r t , must be constant. Therefore, the ratios
g t =K t and x t = X t =K t are constant along the balanced growth path.
In terms of these ratios, ¼-CE conditions can be particularized for a balanced growth path equilibrium to the following system in ¹°, ¹ c;
and ¹ ¿ (letters with bar refer to values along the balanced growth path):
and either
under income taxes, or
under lump-sum taxes. Condition (3.3) comes from the global constraint of resources, (3.4) is the public investment rule, (3.5) is the gross return on capital accumulation, (3.6) is the production function, (3.7) is the public consumption rule and, depending on the tax system considered, either (3.10) or (3.13) refer to the intertemporal substitution of consumption relationship and either (3.9) or (3.12) is the government budget constraint.
In parallel to De…nition 1, for a particular stationary …scal policy
¹ c g g and a stationary …scal policy ¹ ¼ satisfying: (3.3)-(3.7), either (3.8)-(3.10) under income taxes or (3.11)-(3.13) under lumpsum taxes, the transversality condition (2.17) and non-negativity conditions ¹ c > 0 and
The common growth rate property allows us to write the balanced growth version of the transversality condition (2.17) as, lim t!1¯t (1 + ¹°) 1 c = 0, which will be satis…ed by any ¹ ¼-BP .
The full depreciation ¹ ¼-BP
For simplicity, we initially assume that both types of capital fully depreciate each period, so that ± = ± g = 1 in (3.3)-(3.13). This assumption enable us to obtain an analytical characterization of the ¼-CE and the ¹ ¼-BP allocations, so that our results can be compared with those obtained in previous research. 5 Proposition 1 shows the existence of a single ¹ ¼-BP under ± = ± g = 1, 6 provided that { i and { c are such that a positive amount of resources is left to the consumer every period. (3.3)-(3.10), particularized to the case of full depreciation, has a single solution,
5 Together with the assumption that leisure does not enter in the utility function, which is of the logarithmic type. In section 4, full depreciation is shown not to be crucial for the conclusions relating to the growth-maximizing public expenditures policies, although it may be relevant for welfare analysis. 6 In the Appendix (part 1), we show this statement for any ±; ± g 2 [0; 1]. 7 Hereinafter, a d-uppercase denotes a variable under distortionary taxation, while an n-uppercase denotes the value of the variable under non-distortionary taxes.
Similarly, under lump-sum taxes, combining (3.3)-(3.7) with (3.11)-(3.13) leads to,
, which is uniquely de…ned by conditions (3.20)-(3.25) above, will be a ¹ ¼-BP
Characterizing the full depreciation ¼-CE
The simplicity of the model allows for the ¼-CE to be analytically characterized. Regarding the decision rules for C t and K t+1 , we make a linear guess for their dependence on output: C t = aY t and K t+1 = bY t . Under income taxes, taking these linear rules to: (2.13), (2.15), (2.9), (2.6), (2.7), (2.3) together with L t = 1, we get,
; t = 0; 1; 2; :::; (3.26)
; t = 0; 1; 2; :::; (3.27) while taking to (2.14), (2.16), (2.10), (2.6), (2.7) (2.3) the proposed linear rules for capital and consumption, together with L t = 1; under lump-sum taxes, we obtain,
1¡µ ; t = 0; 1; 2; :::; (3.28)
1¡µ ; t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (3.29)
Finally, under both tax systems, combining (2.2), (2.6) and L t = 1, we get
; t = 0; 1; 2; :::
which is, under either tax system, a set of three equations characterizing the propagation mechanism for C t , K t+1 and K g t+1 along a ¼-CE: The characteristics of the dynamics of C t , K t+1 and K g t+1 are given by the eigenvalue structure of the coe¢cient matrix of the state-space representation of the system above, in logs. 8 Independently of the tax system, that matrix has a zero eigenvalue and a second eigenvalue equal to one. The zero eigenvalue re ‡ects the absence of transitional dynamics, while the unit eigenvalue is inherent to sustained growth models, 9 implying that the ratios K g t =K t , C t =K t converge to constant levels, ¹ k g and ¹ c. Since households face a convex control problem, existence and uniqueness of the ¼-CE is guaranteed. Consequently, given K 0 , K g 0 > 0, the previous system provides us with the values of C 0 , K 1 and K g 1 under either tax policy, the three variables growing from that time on at the common rate ¹°given by (3.16) and (3.22).
Income versus lump-sum taxes
In this section, we discuss the possibility that the steady-state growth rate as well as the level of welfare might be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes, when the government chooses the public investment/output ratio, { i , to maximize either growth or welfare. The government is assumed to be constrained by the need to …nance a …xed ratio of unproductive public expenses to output, { c¸0 . From Proposition 1, we already know that any { c < 1 is feasible under income taxes, while { c < 1 ¡ ®¯is the feasibility condition under lump-sum taxes. Hence, we just consider parameterizations in
Maximizing steady-state growth
In an economy without transitional dynamics, welfare is determined by the growth-rate and the initial consumption level, so the in ‡uence of the steady-state growth rate on welfare is obvious. We characterize in this section conditions under which a given tax system produces higher growth, leaving the discussion on the implied welfare levels for the next section. From (3.16), given a value of { c , ¹°is strictly concave in { i , with an interior maximum at
8 Under either tax system, the state-space representation of the decision rules and policy function with which gives us the growth-maximizing level 10 of { i under income taxes. 11 Condition (4.1) includes as special cases the result in section I in Barro (1990) , Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Futagami et al. (1993) , who obtain { d¤ i = µ when working with { c = 0. Under lump-sum taxes, (3.22) shows that the steady-state growth rate ¹°is monotonically increasing and concave in { i , the level of { i being bounded by
This upper bound on { i , which is inversely related to { c , ® and¯, restricts the choice set of the government under lump-sum taxes. Comparing (3.16) with (3.22), we see that the growth rate ¹°will be strictly higher under lump-sum than under income taxes for a common value of { i . This is due to the disincentive e¤ect that a positive capital tax rate exerts on the accumulation of private capital, relative to taxing lump-sum, when …nancing a given level of { i + { c . However, a government interested in maximizing long-run growth would choose a productive public investment ratio { d¤ i under income taxes, choosing an investment ratio as close as possible to { n¤ i under lump-sum taxes. Plugging (4.1), (4.2) in (3.16), (3.22) , the implied growth rates, denoted by ¹°d ¤ and ¹°n ¤ , respectively, satisfy 1 +°d
which increases with
. This is the same condition guaranteeing that { d¤ i > { n¤ i ; which emerges from (4.3) as a necessary condition for°d ¤ >°n ¤ . Hence, for su¢ciently high levels of the non-productive public expenditure ratio, any ordering between the implied growth rates might arise, and Figure 4 .1 shows that, indeed, growth could be higher under distortionary taxes.
The relationship between growth rates can be written,
with ª(!) a function de…ned over . For any given values of ®;¯; µ in , Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a single and positive level of { c , denoted by {°c , for which ª ({°c ; ®;¯; µ) = 0 and ¹°d ¤ = ¹°n ¤ . Values of { c above {°c will signi…cantly reduce the government's choice set for { i under lump-sum taxes so that { n¤ i will fall to the left of A in Figure 4 .1, making ¹°d ¤ to be higher than ¹°n ¤ . 12 Above {°c , the value of { c places an upper bound on the choice of productive public investment under lump-sum taxes which is more damaging for growth than the distortion introduced by income taxes. Finally, Corollary 1 shows that {°c is inversely related to ®,¯and µ. Therefore, in a Barro-type setting, it is more likely that the maximum achievable growth rate will be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes in economies with high values of the unproductive public consumption/output ratio, high private and public capital productivity (high ® and µ) and where households weight heavily future consumption. Proof. ª(!) = 0 de…nes an implicit function which is { 2 on : Let us denote B = 
Since the economy displays no transition, at t = 1 variables are already on their balanced growth path, growing at the steady-state rate unless any policy or structural change occurs. Given K 0 , K g 0 , (3.27), (3.29) and (3.30) show that state variables at t = 1 under the growth-maximizing policies satisfy,
so that the disincentive created by income taxes leads to a private capital stock below that accumulated under lump-sum taxes. The distortion on private capital accumulation decreases for high values of { c , since the K -ratio increases with µ, which explains the result in Corollary 1. The higher the output elasticities of either type of capital, ®, µ, the lower will be the loss of future resources produced by distortionary taxation, so it will be more likely that this system produces higher growth.
Growth in this economy arises from the accumulation of both, private and public capital. A higher preference for future utility increases the desire to save much more under non-distortionary taxation since then, the return to private capital is not taxed. Not leaving many resources for consumption, the government has a limit on their own productive investment expenditures, which restricts the possibilities for future growth. The distortion of unproductive public expenditures in this model is re ‡ected in the fact that under lump-sum taxes too much private capital is accumulated relative to public capital. This disequilibrium is negative for long-run growth, which explains the likely superiority of distortionary taxation.
Theoretical results in Proposition 2 are easy to show because both types of capital fully depreciate every period. However, full depreciation is not needed for the qualitative statements in this proposition. Maintaining the assumption of linear depreciation rates for both types of capital, it is shown in the Appendix (part 1): (a) there exists a single and well-de…ned balanced growth path; (b) the growth-maximizing public investment ratio under income taxes, { d¤ i , is given by (4.1) for any ±; ± g ; (c) the result in Proposition 2 remains valid: the { c -threshold, {°c ; for any ± g 2 [0; 1] and ± = 1 is the same as with ± g = ± = 1, while it is higher 13 than that value when ± 2 [0; 1).
Maximizing welfare
We now extend the analysis to discuss the possibility that the maximum level of welfare might be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes. Given { c¸0 and K 0 ; K g 0 > 0, we assume that the government chooses { i to maximize the welfare of the representative household over the set of ¼-CE allocations. Since under full depreciation of both types of capital the economy displays no transition, the problem reduces to choosing { i such that,
subject to either (3.16) and (3.26) under income taxes or to (3.22) and (3.28) under lump-sum taxes. For 0 <¯< 1, V (C 0 ; ¹°) is strictly concave and bounded and the choice set is convex and compact, so that the optimization problem (4.5) has a single solution. Moreover, since lim 
with { d¤ i and { n¤ i
being the growth-maximizing investment ratios de…ned in (4.1) and (4.2).
Since¯µ 1¡¯(1¡µ) < 1, the growth-maximizing public investment/output ratio is strictly higher than the welfare-maximizing ratio under both tax rules, 15 the di¤erence between them being larger under the less distorting tax system. Under income taxes, the level of { d+ i di¤ers from { d¤ i by the factor¯, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) , since the public capital stock only becomes productive next period and so the representative household discounts the positive e¤ect of public investment on welfare by¯. Under lump-sum taxes, the discrepancy between { n¤ i and { n+ i , measured by¯µ 1¡¯(1¡µ) , is smaller than¯, but it increases with¯and µ. The welfare-maximizing productive public investment ratio is higher under income than under lump-sum taxation for
. 16 To discuss conditions under which welfare could be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes, we evaluate (4.5) under { i = { 
where D(!) is de…ned on . Even though there is no possibility of …nding explicit conditions implying D(!) < 0, for given values of ®;¯; µ, Proposition 3 guarantees existence of a single positive threshold { v c for the non-productive investment ratio, above (below) which taxing the income of productive factors is welfare-superior (-inferior) to taxing lump-sum. Lemmas 1 and 2 show two intermediate results.
14 See Appendix (part 2). Along the paper, a \ + " uppercase denotes a value obtained under a welfaremaximizing public investment strategy. when { c = 0 and ® = 1 ¡ µ (i.e., no spillover in the productive process). Precisely under these conditions, Corsetti and Roubini (1996) show that the welfare-maximizing public investment ratio is independent of the tax system considered in a standard Barro-type framework. 17 See Appendix (part 2) for more details on this point. 
Therefore, there exists a single and well-de…ned threshold for
Corollary 2 shows that { v c declines with ®; the output elasticity of private capital. We also show that there is a threshold µ ¤ ; such that { v c declines with the output elasticity of public capital µ, provided µ > µ ¤ : For standard parameterizations, the implied value of µ ¤ is low enough so that we can safely consider @{ v c =@µ < 0. Finally, a numerical exploration shows that { v c declines with¯when this parameter is close to one, as considered in standard calibrations. This should be expected, since (4.5) shows that as¯approaches 1, maximizing long-run growth and maximizing welfare become equivalent. These results suggest that, as it was the case when comparing growth, high levels of¯, ® and µ increase the likelihood that taxing total income could be a welfare-superior alternative to taxing lump-sum.
, and @{ for the maximum level of welfare to be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes, which is a condition similar to that found when comparing growth rates.
Corollary 3.
A necessary condition for maximum welfare to be larger under income than under lump-sum taxes is that the welfare-maximizing public investment ratio be higher under income than under lump-sum taxes. Proof. Let us assume that maximum welfare is larger under income than under lumpsum taxes. Then, by Proposition 3, { c > { Lack of transitional dynamics allows us to write welfare as in (4.5), a combination of initial consumption and long-term growth. In fact, in choosing one versus the other tax system, we are trading-o¤ current versus future consumption. Taxing income from productive factors disincentives private capital accumulation and reduces long-run growth, with a moderate immediate consumption sacri…ce. Alternatively, lump-sum taxation produces an important consumption sacri…ce initially, to the possible bene…t of higher long-term growth. From (3.26), (3.28) , we have, under the welfare-maximizing public investment ratios,
from which it is not hard to show that initial consumption is always higher under distortionary taxation. 18 In fact, for standard parameterizations, initial consumption can easily be ten or twenty times bigger under income taxes than under lump-sum taxes, even for low { c -ratios.
On the other hand, for small levels of the non-productive public expenditure ratio { c ; growth is higher under non-distortionary taxes and there are two competing e¤ects in (4.5). As we saw in the previous section, it is when { c increases that growth may become higher under distortionary taxation. Hence, any condition favoring higher growth under income taxes will also tend to induce that distortionary taxation might be preferred from the point of view of welfare. In fact, if growth ever gets higher under distortionary taxation, it is clear from (4.5) that this type of taxes will also be preferred in terms of welfare.
In particular, we have already seen that higher output elasticities of either type of capital attenuate the negative e¤ects of the disincentive to accumulate capital, making more likely that long-run growth may be higher under distortionary than under nondistortionary taxation. It is therefore not surprising that they also favor that maximum welfare may be higher under distortionary taxation. Finally, maximizing welfare amounts to maximizing long-run growth for high values of¯, so that an increase in the value of in that range increases the likelihood that distortionary taxation may lead to a higher level of welfare.
A numerical illustration
The purpose of this section is to illustrate some of the main …ndings discussed above with some numerical examples. Speci…cally, for alternative calibrations (i.e., speci…c values for , ® and µ), we …nd the solutions to D({ c ;¯; ®; µ) = 0 and ª({ c ;¯; ®; µ) = 0: Assuming annual data, four alternative parameterizations (bench1, bench2, bench3 and bench4) are considered in table 4.1, all of them sharing a value¯= 0:99. In bench1, we assume a standard parametrization: ® = 0:4, µ = 0:15 so that Á = 1 ¡ ® ¡ µ = 0:45.
Relative to bench1, bench2 is a small variation, with ® = 0:75: This parameterization agrees with a broad interpretation of aggregate capital in the private producing process, K t including human and physical capital [see Romer (1987) ]. In bench3 we consider the possibility of a technology intensive in productive public capital by setting µ = 0:35 [close to the value estimated in Aschauer (1989) ], and ® = 0:4, as in bench1. Finally, bench4 assumes a high productive technology in both types of capital, with ® = 0:7 and µ = 0:3, implying absence of spillover e¤ects.
For each parameterization considered in .7)]. As expected, both thresholds decrease when we increase ® or µ, although it seems that changes in the elasticity of private capital are more relevant. For instance, from bench1, the level of {°c decreases from 60:4% to 59:2% when µ increases from :15 to :35, but it falls down to 24:9% when ® is increased from :40 to :75. A similar observation applies to { v c : The threshold above which growth is higher under distortionary taxation is always higher than the one above which distortionary taxation leads to higher welfare, so the latter situation arises more often, as we pointed out in the previous section.
Productive public investment ratios maximizing either growth or welfare under lumpsum taxes are well below those obtained under distortionary taxation. Finally, under either tax system, investment ratios maximizing welfare are very similar to those maximizing long-run growth. Under distortionary taxation, the { i -ratio maximizing welfare is always below that maximizing growth, the opposite result arising under lump-sum taxes. This is again due to the fact that initial consumption is higher under distortionary taxation.
The presence of the spillover externality allows us to change the values of the output elasticities of private and public capital, ® and µ; independently from each other, but that externality plays a minor role in the model. In fact, the proofs to all results in the previous section remain valid for the case Á = 0; so long as we maintain the restriction ® + µ = 1:
Conclusions
The superiority of non-distorting versus distorting taxation in endogenous growth economies has been challenged from di¤erent perspectives. In particular, it is already well known that positive taxation on the income of productive factors may be growth and welfare enhancing when it corrects a negative externality in the competitive equilibrium allocation.
Along this line, we have shown that existence of a signi…cant level of non-productive public investment, as a percentage of output, is a su¢cient condition for income taxes to lead to higher long-run growth and welfare than lump-sum taxes. Speci…cally, we have characterized a threshold for the unproductive public expenditure/output ratio, above (below) which taxing productive factors' income results in a welfare-superior (inferior) …nancing alternative to taxing lump-sum. The higher the output elasticities of public and private capital, the lower the threshold for the unproductive public expenditure/output ratio, favoring income taxes to be preferred to lump-sum taxes for steady-state growth and welfare.
A given level of non-productive public expenditures works as a negative externality, which is more damaging under non-distortionary taxation. In that case, accumulation of private capital is stronger because the return on capital is not being taxed. As a consequence, less resources are left for public investment, which limits the scope for future growth. A higher time discount factor increases the desire to accumulate capital, intensifying the e¤ect of this externality and making more likely that distortionary taxes may be preferred to lump-sum taxes.
Welfare analysis has been relatively easy to make under the assumption that both types of capital fully depreciate every period. This assumption allows us to solve for the competitive equilibrium analytically, although in a framework too simple to establish strong policy recommendations. Regarding long-run growth, we have shown that full depreciation is not determinant for the qualitative and quantitative conclusions, since the analysis is of the steady-state type. Less than full depreciation in public and private capital would alter the model signi…cantly, since the steady-state would no longer be reached in just one period. Welfare analysis then requires a full characterization of the transitional dynamics, which can only be done through numerical solution methods. That would be an interesting extension of this paper. with ¹ ¿ = 0 under lump-sum taxes and ¹ ¿ = { i + { c under income taxes. Using this together with (3.3)-(3.6), which are valid under either tax system, we get,
whose positive roots are potential candidates to be steady-state values of
, which de…nes the steady-state of the economy.
Lemma 3. Under either tax system, the steady-state level of ¹ k g is inversely related to the productive public investment ratio { i :
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the { 2 -mapping ©(¢) and using the fact that under income taxes ¹ ¿ = { i + { c , we get,
while under lump-sum taxes,
We prove next that, under income taxes, expression (4.1) for the growth-maximizing ratio { Lemma 4. Under income taxes, the growth-maximizing ratio is
Proof. From (3.4) and (3.3) we get: lim
¹°= ¡± g < 0 and lim 
The qualitative result in Proposition 2 holds for ± g < 1:
The {°c -threshold is the same as that characterized in the proposition, so long as ± = 1: If ± < 1; the {°c -threshold is higher than that in Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. There is a critical value of { c ,{°c , above (below) which the maximum achievable growth rate is higher (lower) under income than under lump-sum taxes. For any ± g 2 [0; 1] and ± = 1, this { c -threshold is the same as with ± g = ± = 1, while it is higher than that value when ± 2 [0; 1).
Proof. Since the growth rate under lump-sum taxes is increasing in { i for any ± g ; ± 2 [0; 1], the highest feasible growth rate that can be achieved under lump-sum taxes is again obtained for a productive investment ratio of { n¤ i ; the level of { i implying ¹ c n = 0: Let us denote by{°c the { c -threshold above which the maximum growth rate under income taxes becomes higher than growth under { Thus, by de…nition,{°c ,
¹ c n = 0 under lump-sum taxes for { i = { n¤ i , and (4) for { c ={°c , the growth rate obtained under { d¤ i ; must be equal to the upper bound on growth rates under lump-sum taxes, i.e., the growth rate that would be obtained under { n¤ i . These conditions reduce to:
Subtracting (6.6) from (6.7) and combining with (6.8),
Plugging (6.10) into (6.9),
On the other hand, adding up (6.7) and (6.8), 
which has the same roots as the ª-function de…ned in (4.4). Consequently,{°c = {°c , the same value obtained under full depreciation of both types of capital. Alternatively, if ± 2 [0; 1) we would have (1 ¡¯) (1 ¡ ±) > 0 in (6.12), which implies that, for any ± g 2 [0; 1], we have { n i > 1 ¡{°c ¡¯®, and hence{°c > {°c Even though the {°c -threshold changes with the depreciation rate of private capital, this e¤ect is minor. Table 6 .1 summarizes a numerical example for µ = :15, ® = :75 and = :99. System (6.6)-(6.9) is solved for this calibration to obtain{°c , which turns out to vary just between 24:9% and 25:5% for ± g ; ± k 2 [0; 1].
Part 2: The welfare-maximizing public investment ratio
Under income taxes: plugging (3.26) and (3.16) into (4.5), we get the optimization problem,
where ¢ =1 ¡¯l n z+1 ¡¯( 1¡µ) ln (®¯)+ln
Hence, the welfare-maximizing ratio, { d+ i , is the solution to,
In a similar way, under lump-sum taxes: plugging (3.28) and (3.22) into (4.5), 6.16) and the welfare-maximizing ratio, { n+ i , the solution to Let us denote: ' (µ;¯) =¯µ 2 + 3 (1 ¡¯) µ ¡ (1 ¡¯), a second degree polynomial in µ for each given¯; with ' (0;¯) < 0; ' (1;¯) > 0: Its two roots are given by:
where it is clear that µ ¡ < 0; while it is not hard to show that µ + < 1: Hence, in the range of feasible values of µ, the [0,1]-interval, the ' (µ;¯) polynomial moves from negative to positive, crossing the µ-axis just once. Equivalently, w (µ;¯) is convex between µ = 0 and the positive root, µ = µ + , and concave to the right of that point, being di¤erentiable on is the value of the ratio maximizing welfare under lump-sum taxes. 
